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This Bachelor’s thesis discusses the relationship between generating and curating in the context of 
artistic activity. In this context, generating refers to processes and systems used in generative art 
and generative design. Curating refers to the traditional profession of producing exhibitions, and to 
the contemporary definition of curating as a universal act of selection and evaluation. The objective 
of this thesis is to introduce the processes and methods used in generating and curating, and to 
expose the creative potential emerging from the combination of these practices. 
The research analyses and compares contemporary discourses of generating and curating, and pre-
sents examples of modern generative and curatorial practices. A joint framework is proposed which 
illustrates the interconnection of generating and curating. Theories of creativity by Deleuze and Bo-
den & Wiggings are accommodated in the framework to demonstrate the potential of the synthesis 
for emergent outcomes. 
Despite the apparent discreteness of generating and curating, they in fact share many characteristics, 
both practical and conceptual. They both require the definition of a rule, which determines the cura-
torial or generative process. In generative design or art, this rule is an algorithm or some other for-
malisation of an action, in curating the rule is the selection criteria of the collection. Both in generating 
and curating, the agent creates the process instead of designing directly the product. Generating re-
quires curating in evaluating and selecting the outcomes, as curating depends upon generating in 
forming the collection according to the selective rules. Deleuze’s concepts of ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ cap-
ture the emergent properties of generating and curating: the rules define the ‘virtual’ cloud of possible 
outcomes, from which the perceptible products are actualised. Thus, generating and curating both 
supervene on and contain each other. 
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The treasure was far underground, beneath a network of passages, in 
a single room filled with black. Information at the quantum density, 
undamaged. Maybe five billion years had passed since the archive 
was lost to the nets. … They would live here a year or five, the little 
company from Straum, the archaeologist programmers, their families 
and schools. …
So now there was a tiny settlement on the surface, and they called it 
the High Lab. It was really just humans playing with an old library. 
It should be safe, using their own automation, clean and benign. 
This library wasn’t a living creature, or even possessed of automation 
(which here might mean something more, far more, than human). 
They would look and pick and choose, and be careful not to be 
burned… Humans starting fires and playing with the flames.
The archive informed the automation. Data structures were built, 
recipes followed. A local network was built, faster than anything on 
Straum, but surely safe. Nodes were added, modified by other recipes. 
The archive was a friendly place, with hierarchies of translation keys 
that led them along. 
 > Vernor Vinge, A Fire Upon the Deep, 1991
There are notions that are exact in nature, quantitative, defined 
by equations, and whose very meaning lies in their exactness: a 
philosopher or writer can use these only metaphorically, and that’s 
quite wrong, because they belong to exact science. But there are also 
essentially inexact yet completely rigorous notions that scientists 
cannot do without, which belong equally to scientists, philosophers, 
and artists. They have to be made rigorous in a way that’s not directly 
scientific, so that when a scientist manages to do this he becomes 
a philosopher, an artist, too. This sort of concept’s not unspecific 
because something’s missing but because of its nature and content. 
 > Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1990
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1 Introduction
 > Imagine opening any of your favourite websites or 
applications. Be it a social media site, such as 
Facebook, Twitter or Instagram; a streaming service 
like Netflix or Spotify; or a platform for sharing 
content in the manner of Tumblr or Pinterest; what 
you will discover is a cornucopia of images, text, 
audio and video, readily available and easy to reach. 
However, the incredible abundance of accessible 
material makes the need of filtering inevitable, for 
the user to locate what they are searching or to 
discover new, relevant content.
 > This organising, enumerating and evaluating of the 
content can be carried out by in-built algorithms 
in the digital platform, or by the user themself. 
The platform might use taxonomical classifications 
for material, like filters for cinematic genres and 
sub-genres in Netflix, or it might recommend new 
content based on the categorisations, reviews and 
social connections of previously accessed items, much 
like Instagram suggests images and videos according 
the user’s likes, hashtags and followed accounts. 
The platform might even offer user-customised 
collections, such as personalised playlists in 
Spotify. On the other hand, the user themself 
chooses, classifies and catalogues the content, by 
selecting what material they share, which hashtags 
they apply to it, and how they distribute it in 
albums, boards and threads.
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 > This interchangeability of classifying, framing and 
fabricating in modern digital media illustrates the 
focal point of this thesis: the connection between the 
acts of curating and generating. The aforementioned 
user emulates in their actions the traditional 
occupation of a curator as a person who selects, 
organises and tends to the items of a collection, 
while the platform exhibits characteristics of both 
curatorial and generative practices. The collections, 
such as playlists or catalogues of recommendations, 
are generated by predefined algorithms, into which the 
personalising variables are inserted to produce quasi-
curated compilations.
 > For the purpose of this thesis, generating and 
curating are defined as follows: generating covers the 
practices used in generative design and generative 
art ( defined in detail in chapter 2.1), with the 
focus on algorithmic and digital generative processes. 
Curating is defined as the researching, appraising, 
contextualising, selecting, organising, presenting 
and managing of items, historically carried out by 
curators ( elaborated in chapter 3.1). This thesis, 
however, relies on the contemporary discourse, 
where curating is considered as a methodology or an 
operational tool in a universal setting, not only as 
a traditional occupation in the context of museums 
( Obrist 2015; O’Neill, 2012; Vishmid, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
contemporary literature states that an exhibition 
of visual artefacts is still the main medium of the 
curatorial practice ( Obrist, 2015: 38; O’Neill, 2012: 90; Filipovic, 
2013). In this thesis the product and medium of the 
universal curator is generalised as ‘a collection’, 
which can consist of any kind of physical, digital or 
abstract elements.
 > The motivation of this thesis arises from the current 
relevance of the concepts of curating and generating. 
As stated earlier, the practice of curating has 
undergone a major paradigm shift in the last decade: 
it has transcended the traditional context of museums, 
and even the entire art world, to incorporate a large 
variety of activities ( Obrist, 2015; O’Neill, 2012; Vishmid, 
2006). One of the most influential curators of the 
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twenty-first century, Hans Ulrich Obrist ( 2015: 34-36), 
states, that the current trend of applying the concept 
of ‘curation’ to a myriad of contexts ‘records a 
shift in understanding from a person ( a curator) 
to an enterprise ( curating)’. According to Obrist, 
this repurposing stems from the same situation as 
was described in the opening passage: ‘[the] feature 
of modern life that is impossible to ignore: the 
proliferation and reproduction of ideas, raw data, 
processed information, images, disciplinary knowledge 
and material’. Obrist continues to suggest that this 
proliferation is shifting the emphasis from producing 
new content to selecting from the already existing 
pool of material. The expression of ‘content curation’ 
has gradually become an integral feature of marketing 
and media vocabulary, its applications ranging from 
devising a selection of an shoe store to moderating a 
recipe portal. Obrist ( 2015: 211) records the words of 
his fellow curator Steward Brand: ‘[Curating has] been 
democratised by the net, so, in one sense, everybody 
is curating. If you’re writing a blog, it’s curating. 
So we’re becoming editors and curators, and those two 
are blending online.’
 > Also generative design and generative art have evolved 
greatly during the past few decades. The availability 
and usability of design software, such as Processing, 
AutoDesk, Rhinoceros, and several other CAD ( Computer 
Aided Design) and 3D modelling programmes, have 
revolutionised the field by making the means more 
approachable for a greater variety of designers and 
artist. Also the advancement of 3D-printing and other 
rapid manufacturing methods have made possible the 
easy prototyping and production of unique generative 
designs with the same costs and effort as identical 
objects ( Soddu, 2002: 8). In addition, initiatives 
such as Google’s Deep Dream ( Google developers, 2016) have 
popularised and advertised the possibilities of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the 
creative context, which has increased the public 
interest in generative art and design.
 > Despite the easy access to generative design tools, 
many designers and artist still seem apprehensive 
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towards techniques which require even a minimum of 
manual computation or programming skills. Therefore 
one of the motivations of this thesis is to make 
algorithmic processes more approachable by providing 
tangible analogies for generative systems. This 
thesis also aims to offer new modes of thought for 
those already involved in generative design or art. 
According to Maeda ( 1999: 10), many practitioners treat 
generative processes as kind of ‘black box’1 models 
that produce automatically interesting results, 
regardless of the input or the actual procedure. 
In fact, many techniques with seemingly unique 
outcomes, such as randomisation, are actually highly 
standardised and the results often homogenous. Artists 
and designers engaged with creative generative systems 
should try to escape this ‘algorithmic genericism’ 
( McCormac et al., 2014: 139) caused by the re-appropriation 
of habitual tools and simulations. This can be 
achieved by pursuing new ways of implementing and 
representing generative methods, as well as addressing 
the conceptual instead of the technical aspects of the 
process.
 > In conclusion, this thesis aspires to fulfil the 
previous objectives by analysing and comparing the 
discourses of generating and curating. These practices 
are introduced in chapters 2 and 3 respectively, with 
a review of existing literature and some demonstrative 
examples. Regarding curation, the emphasis is on 
contemporary literature, in which the changing role of 
curatorial practice transcending the museum context 
is acknowledged. However, little academic research has 
been conducted on the more speculative implementations 
of curatorial practice, so the available material is 
mostly anecdotal and still partially confined in the 
traditional context of the art world. In regard of 
generating, the focus is on academic literature since 
the 1990s, where the concepts of generative art and 
1 Latour ( 1999: 304) describes black boxing as ‘the way scientific and technical 
work is made invisible by its own success. When a machine runs efficiently, 
when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs 
and not on its internal complexity’.
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generative design have been established. Chapter 4 
suggests a joint framework for generating and 
curating, which aims to demonstrate the correspondence 
between the practices. The chapter also addresses the 
immense creative potential arising from the synthesis, 
along with the introduction of Deleuze’s concept of 
‘the virtual’ ( Brassett and Marenko, 2015) and the Creative 
System by Boden ( 1990, 1994) and Wiggins ( 2001, 2003). 
Finally, chapter 5 discusses the social and cultural 
implications of generating and curating by raising 
some questions of agency and power.
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2 Generating 
 > In the present context there is no need to address 
the concepts of generative art and generative 
design separately, since the variations of their 
processes and products can be greater within the 
disciplines than between them. In addition, some 
writers, like Soddu ( 1994, 2002, 2006), do not make 
distinctions between generative art and design. Thus 
in the following chapters the terms will be used 
interchangeably, and chapter 2.2. will briefly discuss 
the most fundamental differences between generative 
art and generative design.
2.1 META-PROJECTS AND IDEA-PRODUCTS
 > ‘To generate’ essentially means ‘to create’ or 
‘to produce’, so what makes generative art and 
generative design different from the usual creative 
or manufactural endeavours? The mathematical 
definition of the word offers a useful insight, by 
stating that generating entails performing a set 
of logical operations as the method of production. 
Correspondingly, many writers have outlined that the 
utilisation of some kind of logical rule is inherent 
to generative techniques. ( Soddu, 2006; Singh and Gu, 2011; 
Maeda, 1999). Soddu ( 2006: np) provides the following 
definition: ‘Generative Design is a logical synthesis 
of a creative process using transformation rules 
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( algorithms).’ As algorithms often refer to problem-
solving procedures carried out by computers, it is 
easy to make the common assumption that generative 
art/design is exclusively digital and computational. 
Consequently, in their definition of generative 
design, Singh and Gu ( 2011: 185) emphasise the benefits 
of harnessing the computational capabilities 
of the computer for exploring design solutions. 
However, Dorin et al ( 2012: 240) astutely point out 
that ‘Generative art is neither technological, nor 
specifically digital, despite the recent popularity 
of works that are both’. Galanter ( 2003: 4) succeeds in 
providing an all-encompassing definition which allows 
a greater variety of methods for generation: 
Generative art refers to any art practice where the artist 
creates a process, such as a set of natural language 
rules, a computer program, a machine, or other 
procedural invention, which is then set into motion 
with some degree of autonomy contributing to or 
resulting in a completed work of art.
 > Thus according to Galanter, the nature of the 
generative process is almost completely free for 
interpretation: it can be physical or digital, natural 
or artificial, straight-forward and computational or 
complex and random. Despite the variation of methods, 
all definitions of generative art/design seem to 
highlight the procedural nature of the discipline: the 
primary intention of the artist/designer is not to 
create a finished product/artwork, but to to create the 
process which gives birth to the product/artwork. Soddu 
( 2006: np) describes this idea of ‘designing design’ as 
follows: ‘Generative Design could be represented like 
a morphogenetic meta-project, an organized idea of “how 
to run” a design process.’ So the actual product of 
the generative artwork / design schema is the process 
itself as an ‘idea-product’, and the finished outcome of 
the generative process is one of the possible temporal 
manifestations of the ‘idea-product’ ( Soddu, 2002: 291).
 > Dorin et al ( 2012) deliver perhaps the most 
comprehensive definition for generative art. In 
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addition to emphasising the process as the most 
essential part of the discipline, they describe 
altogether five characteristics of generative 
artworks, which they identify as entities, processes, 
environmental interaction, and sensory outcomes.
 > Entities describes the physical or simulated subjects 
the generative process acts upon. They can consist of 
a population of homogenous elements or an ecosystem 
of dissimilar classes of agents. The entities must 
have formally defined attributes ( spatial, temporal 
or formal properties) which the process can affect and 
alter.
 > Processes are the operations which change the states 
of the entities. The events can be hierarchical, so 
that micro processes form macro processes; causal, 
or interacted with by a feedback system; autonomous, 
or initiated by an active agent; and continuous, or 
temporally set with a terminating condition.
 > Environmental interaction is the flux of information between 
the process and the environment. Manipulating and 
adjusting the generative process, either with 
continuous user-interface and feedback-loop or with 
discreet events of alteration, the environmental 
interaction subsequently modifies the outcomes. The 
‘environment’ in this case refers to any entity 
outside the process itself, including the artist/
designer.
 > Sensory outcomes are the experienced products of the 
generative process. They can be artefacts, such 
as the end result of the terminated process, or 
records of its different stages. The unfolding of the 
generative process itself can also be the outcome as 
a performative gesture. If the entities and results 
of the process are not apparent, they must be rendered 
perceivable by some sort of mapping. It can be 
simply a visual representation created by a computer 
software, or an arbitrary creative choice. If there is 
no inherent relationship between the entities and the 
process, the physical manifestations of the generative 
system are open for creative interpretation.
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2.2 GENERATIVE ART AND GENERATIVE DESIGN: MEANS OR ENDS?
 > Despite the fact that creating the process is the 
main pursuit in both generative design and generative 
art, the disciplines treat this process slightly 
differently. In the context of design ( especially 
industrial design and architecture), generating often 
has an utilitarian value as a tool, while in the art 
context the characteristics of the generative process 
itself posses some intrinsic value. For example, Singh 
and Gu ( 2011: 185) emphasise the practical benefits of 
automating parts of the design process: generative 
methods can be used for solving various optimisation 
problems, which can reduce the costs and increase 
the efficiency of the design instance. Generative 
simulations also decrease the need for trials and 
testing, and computer-regulated processes can help 
gaining a higher level of accuracy and consistency in 
the finished products. Also Maeda ( 1999: 10) accentuates 
the usefulness of the generative design process to 
the finished product: ‘Modern design objects display 
in their function and form the process that generated 
them. Such objects are determined not by the process 
but rather by the use that is made of it.’
 > In generative art, however, the process itself can 
be the main focus as an artistic performance and be 
exhibited along the product ( Dorin et al., 2012: 256). The 
autonomous nature of generative processes is often 
accentuated in the art context: by reducing the 
intentionality of the artist, the process can lead to 
emergent, unpredictable outcomes ( Dorin et al., 2012: 256; 
McCormac et al). The concept of emergence refers here to 
the characteristic ‘coming-into-existence’ which takes 
place in generative processes: the outcomes arise from 
complex causes and exceed the sum of their effects.
 > However, the juxtaposition of intrinsic and extrinsic 
values of generative processes in art and design can 
also be reversed: in the art context algorithms and 
mathematical operations can be used as a tool for 
eliminating manual repetition and need of human motor 
skills, for example in creating intricate, geometric 
patterns ( Maeda, 1999). Correspondingly, in the design 
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context complex generative systems can be used as a 
starting point for exploring the creative space ( Soddu, 
2002: 7; Singh & Gu, 2012: 185). Eventually, the fundamental 
differences between generative design and generative 
art are derivative of the contrasting objectives of 
art and design: design in its traditional sense aims 
to find solutions to problems2, while art necessarily 
does not.
2.3 DETERMINATION AND CHAOS: 
REVIEW OF GENERATIVE PROCESSES
 > If the defining characteristic of generative art 
is the use of operational rules as a method of 
production, then generative art can be said to be 
as old as art itself. From Palaeolithic ornaments 
to Islamic mosaics and Buddhist mandalas, humans 
have always used arithmetic and geometric rules for 
aesthetic expression ( Dorin et al., 2012: 240). With the 
proliferation of digital computers towards the end 
of the 20th century, the encoding and execution of 
such deterministic computational processes has become 
increasingly easy and attainable. Since the use of the 
computer as an executional tool has become routine for 
designer and artist, the contemporary discipline tends 
to lean towards complex, non-deterministic generative 
processes which exhibit emergence and variance. 
This chapter will briefly introduce some common 
generative techniques and their implementations. These 
examples focus on demonstrating the aspects of order, 
determinism, agency and subjectivity in generative 
processes, which will later be used to illustrate the 
connections between generating and curating.
 > Many generative methods, such as cellular automata 
and L-systems, pursue complexity by borrowing their 
operational rules from nature. Singh and Gu ( 2011) 
2 This generalisation has understandably met a great deal of opposition in the 
past, and many writers have argued agains the narrow role of a designer as a 
service provider and problem solver. For further reference, see for example 
Potter (1968), van Toorn (2004), Bailey (2007) and Poynor (2008). 
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describe these two methods as follows: Cellular 
automata are discrete models consisting of regular 
grids of cells with a finite number of defined states 
( for example ‘on’ and ‘off’). When the cellular 
automation is set into motion, the cells change their 
state according to the states of their neighbouring 
cells, defined by a set of rules ( an algorithm). 
Depending on the rule used, the cellular automation 
system can exhibit diverse behaviour, fluctuating 
between mathematical order and apparent, life-like 
randomness. Figure 2.1. depicts a knitted tea cosy with 
a static pattern of a cellular automation process.
 > L-systems or Lindenmayer systems, are mathematical 
algorithms that mimic the biological process of growth 
by generating recursive, self-similar forms ( Singh and 
Gu, 2011). This kind of fractal sequences can be found 
in numerous natural formations, one example being the 
branching growth pattern of tree limbs, mimicked with 
L-systems in figure 2.2.
 > Despite the apparent organic nature of generative 
methods such as cellular automata and L-systems, they 
are still fairly deterministic: using the same rule for 
the same entities, the generated results are always 
identical. If one of the main incentives for using 
generative processes is to reach emergent results, 
then the artist/designer has to increase the system’s 
autonomy by some means. This can be achieved by 
introducing some form of randomisation to the process. 
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 > McCormac et al ( 2014: 138) point out that chance 
events are widely used in generative art to make the 
underlying deterministic process seem more varied and 
‘humane’. It is true, that randomisation removes some 
of the intentionality of the artist, thus providing an 
relatively easy source of apparent emergence. However, 
Maeda ( 1999: 247) objects the use of randomisation as 
an all-cure remedy for unimaginative, rigid processes: 
’Randomness is a form of profanity you should avoid, 
or at least know where it comes from.’ McCormac et al 
( 2014: 138) accurately remind us that not all randomness 
is equally random: 
We can distinguish different sources of randomness 
in generative art. The first is “pure” randomness, 
obtained by a physical process such as rolling dice, 
tossing coins or dividing piles of yarrow sticks, as used 
in generating hexagrams for the I Ching. With the use 
of computers, pseudo-randomness, where the numbers 
are obtained by a deterministic function, but pass 
statistical tests for randomness, has largely replaced 
pure randomness.
 > A copybook example of pure randomness is Knowles’s 
Tree drawings series ( 2005-2012, figure 2.3.), where the 
artist attached drawing implements to tree branches, 
which then created paintings while moving in the 
wind ( Knowles, nd). This artwork also exemplifies the 
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‘environmental interaction’ introduced in chapter 2.1: 
the wind acts as an indeterministic outside force that 
acts upon the entities of the generative process. On 
the other hand, Rosebush’s Letter Field ( 1975, figure 2.4.) 
illustrates the use of pseudo-randomness in generative 
art. Rosebush utilised random number generators 
to determine the size, colour and position of the 
letterforms in the composition. The in-built random 
number generators in programming languages might serve 
their purpose in providing seemingly un-repeatable 
results, but what is the actual value and purpose of 
this randomness? McCormac et al ( 2014: 138) suggest, 
that in generative art the allegorical associations 
of chance might be more important than its origins. 
This brings us back to the ‘algorithmic genericism’ 
discussed in the introduction: truly emergent results 
can hardly be reached with arbitrary randomisation of a 
limited number of variables, but with more conceptual, 
complex, and comprehensive generative systems.
 > There are, however, indeterministic generative methods 
that can be used to escape the arbitrariness of 
randomisation. These methods, such as genetic algorithms and 
swarm intelligence, posses a greater degree of ‘intelligent’ 
autonomy, thus resulting in generated products that 
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are still highly explorative but less erratic. Genetic 
algorithms, like the previously introduced L-systems 
and cellular automata, borrow their methods from 
nature. Holland ( 1975, cited in Ushakov, 2014: 97) describes the 
process as follows: 
A Genetic Algorithm is a method of problem analysis 
based on Darwin’s theory of natural selection. It starts 
with an initial population of individual nodes, each with 
randomly generated characteristics. Each is evaluated by 
some method to see which ones are more successful. These 
successful ones are then merged into one ‘child’ that has a 
combination of traits of the parents’ characteristics.
 > So genetic algorithms use basic randomisation in the 
initiation phase, but the fitness of the individual 
solutions increases systematically with every new 
generation. Consequently, genetic algorithms are often 
used in optimisation problems, where the optimal 
functionality of the product can be quantitatively 
evaluated ( Ushakov, 2014: 97-99). Such an example are the 
evolutionary antenna designs by NASA, where a genetic 
algorithm was used to produce and evaluate millions 
of options to define the shape of an effective space 
antenna ( Bluck, 2004, Figure 2.5).
 > A genetic algorithm requires the definition of two 
basic components: First, a genetic representation 
( the ‘genotype’) of the resulting individuals ( which 
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express their genetic makeup in their physical 
form, or the ‘phenotype’), and secondly, a fitness 
function to evaluate the solutions ( Ushakov, 2014: 
98). This formalisation of the design concept to the 
logical language of the genetic code and the fitness 
function can be seen as an primary example of all 
generative processes: the genetic algorithm is the 
‘idea-product’, and the resulted designs its possible 
manifestations. Accordingly, Soddu ( 2002: 291) uses the 
evolutionary metaphor of ‘artificial DNA’ to describe 
all generative art and design:
In the field of generative art and design, design 
concepts are represented as code. This generative 
code functions as DNA does in nature. It uses 
artificial life to generate a multiplicity of possible 
artworks, artificial events, architectures and virtual 
environments. … It represents an artificial species able 
to generate an endless sequence of individual events, 
each one different, unique and unrepeatable but 
belonging to the same identifiable design Idea.’
 > In addition to the functional use of genetic 
algorithms in optimisation problems, they can be 
also utilised for more creative design exploration. 
Because of the highly automated and multi-staged 
process, genetic algorithms can yield complex and 
emergent results. Soddu’s Argenia project demonstrates 
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the use of genetic algorithms in a more expressive and 
experimental context: Argenia is a generative software 
which can produce various kinds of industrial objects, 
each unique, but representing the characteristics that 
are required for the said class of objects ( Soddu, 2002). 
Figure 2.6. depicts a population of lamps generated 
with Argenia. Soddu describes how the generative 
method does not simply combine predefined parts, 
such as the lampshade and the stand, but creates 
completely independent forms within the guidelines 
and limitations defined in the artificial DNA and the 
fitness function. Soddu ( 1998: np) also recognises the 
issue of the designer’s subjectivity that arises with 
these definitions:
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The genetic algorithms are used to perform the 
selection. But the selection, in design approach, is 
not only the selection between choices with different 
functional or quantified qualities. … When the 
alternatives are between different possibilities with the 
same functional level of quality, the selection is only 
the exploding of the designer identity.
 > So, if the designer deviates from the straightforward 
praxis of design-as-problem-solving, the generated 
results can not be quantitatively optimised. This 
means that the evaluation of the fitness is a 
subjective act of selection; a form of curating. The 
next chapter will introduce some main points of the 
contemporary curatorial discourse, and chapter 4 will 
further elaborate the relationship between generating 
and curating.
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3 Curating
3.1 FROM OBSCURITIES TO OBRIST
 > With the free circulation of content via modern 
communications networks, it is easy to forget how 
new the concept of a publicly accessible collection 
actually is. The idea of the public museum came 
into being as late as the end of the 18th century, 
as a consequence of large private collections being 
inherited by democratic states ( Obrist, 2015: 57). These 
private collections were often in the form of a 
Wunderkammer, a chamber of curiosities: a motley, 
unorganised accumulation of artworks, instruments 
and natural objects; oddities and artefacts from 
far away places and foreign cultures; archived 
by natural scientist, monks, artists and wealthy 
dilettantes alike ( Obrist, 2015: 54-55). These vast, public 
archives naturally needed organising, cataloguing and 
maintaining, and thus the traditional role of the 
curator as the professional caretaker and trained 
expert of the collection was established.
 > Of course one can argue that curatorial practices 
are an inseparable part of the circulation and 
presentation of art: 15th century aristocrats served 
as patrons and private collectors ( Morgan, 2013), 
ordering artworks and displaying them in private 
venues, or presenting them as gifts for public viewing 
in churches or other institutions. This aspect of the 
curator as the connoisseur and gatekeeper of taste 
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and history is one that can not be undermined. By 
selecting what is shown, maintained and thus valued, 
the curator has the capability to educate and restore, 
but also the power to re-contextualise and manipulate 
( O’Neill, 2012: 90). Obrist ( 2015: 54) sums successfully the 
opportunities and responsibilities of the curator:
 > To make a collection is to find, acquire, organize and 
store items, it is also, inevitably, a way of thinking 
about the world – the connections and principles 
that produce a collection contain assumptions, 
juxtapositions, findings, experimental possibilities 
and associations.
 > Therefore, the collection can be described as the 
physical manifestation of the curator’s interior world 
and intentions, and thus the curator can be seen as 
an original author and artist. The concept of the 
‘artist-curator’ or ‘curator-as-author’ has been well-
established in the contemporary curatorial discourse 
( Obrist, 2015, Hoffman, 2013; Filipovic 2013; Vishmid 2006), all of 
which denotes a paradigm shift in the traditional role 
of the curator.
3.2 THE UBIQUITOUS CURATOR
 > Since the emergence of disruptive conceptual art 
towards the end of the last century, the role of the 
artist has become to resemble that of the curator. 
The practice of art has shifted from the mere craft-
like producing of art objects towards the manipulating 
of readymades, assembling of installations, managing 
of systems and mediating information ( Vishmid, 2006: 
44-45; Obrist, 2015: 46-47). Because these methods adopted 
by contemporary artists overlap with the curatorial 
practice, the contemporary curator has had to become 
an independent maker of meaning.
 > While the traditional ‘salon style’ of the early 
exhibitions accentuated taxonomic schools of painting 
and commonalities of motifs ( Obrist, 2015: 40), the role 
of the modern curator transcends the apparent methods 
of classification and arrangement. As Filipovic 
( 2013: 75) states, “Exhibition is not just the sum of its 
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artworks, but also the relationship created between 
them, the dramaturgy around them, and the discourse 
that frames them.” So the curator-as-author has 
assumed the role of motivator of events and convener of 
disciplines in addition to the traditional taste-making 
one ( Vishmid, 2006: 45). Also after the proliferation of 
the contemporary ( but once-disruptive) consensus of art as 
act of naming—that anything which is called art is 
art—the only inhibitors of the complete dissipation of 
the art world have been the capitalist market powers 
and institutional authority. Therefore the curator, 
working in a commercial gallery or a public museum, 
has gained influence as the central interpreter of 
art, a position once reserved mainly for the critic or 
the collector. ( Vishmid, 2006: 44-45)
 > Gertrude Stein, an avid art collector herself, 
claimed that museums are the cemeteries of culture, 
and therefore can never be modern ( Obrist, 2015: 132). 
Whether or not one agrees with the statement, it is 
apparent that ubiquitous digital media has diminished 
the role of the museum and the gallery as the 
exclusive sources of artistic stimuli. What is then 
the domain of the contemporary curator, if museums 
and galleries have become redundant and outdated? The 
curator could commandeer new, unexpected venues for 
staging the modern-day theatre of the exhibition, 
like Obrist ( 2015), who boasts arranging exhibitions 
in restaurants, airplanes, domestic kitchens and even 
in the sewage system. The curator could also invent 
and implement new practices for reactivating and 
re-contextualising the existing collections ( Obrist, 
2015: 132), exemplified by John Cage’s exhibition 
Rolywholyover in chapter 3.3. and Paolozzi in chapter 
4.2.4. Maybe most in line with the concept of curator-
as-author is the generative approach to curating, 
where the curator acts as an instigator of a process 
giving birth to the exhibition, illustrated by 
Obrist’s  do it exhibition in chapter 3.3.
 > An even more far-reaching approach to curation would 
be to abandon the context of the art world altogether, 
and treat curation not as an occupation, but as 
an independent methodology or operational tool in 
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a universal setting ( Hoffman, 2013). As mentioned in 
the introduction, the new relevance of curatorial 
control and concepts such as content curation 
have emerged, because of the abundance of stimuli 
and material provided by digitalisation have made 
filtering indispensable. In addition, curatorial 
practices can be adapted to the digital realm very 
naturally, since programmatic online spaces inherently 
support classification and categorisation, which 
are quintessential to curating. In the endless, 
immaterial networks of data, the ubiquitous curator 
faces opportunities not provided by the traditional 
practice of displaying artefacts in a physical venue: 
the collection is no more limited by location, space, 
budget, or availability, and the curator is free to 
create chains of context and hierarchy by linking, 
collaborating, and re-appropriating. ( Paul, 2006: 87-99)
3.3 DEMONSTRATING THE DEMATERIALISED
 > The practice of curating has naturally evolved 
simultaneously with the practice of art. Especially 
the approaches exercised in early conceptual art 
can be seen as a major influence for the concurrent 
experiments in curation. Lillemose ( 2006: 118-124) 
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describes, how artists in 1960s and 1970s, such as 
the Fluxus group, strived to dematerialise the art 
object by shifting the attention from the physical 
dimensions of the artwork to the conceptual and 
procedural. Lillemose reminds, however, that this 
post-formalist approach doesn’t necessarily render 
the physical artwork superfluous or require concrete 
immateriality. It simply uses the tangible as a media 
for concentrating on the contexts, contingencies, 
systems and the ‘flux … of postmodern culture’ ( Lillemose 
2006: 124), much like contemporary curating.
 > Many examples of curatorial practice with similar 
conceptual tendencies emerged already in the 1960s 
( Filipovic 2013). This chapter will examine two cases 
of contemporary curation in light of the new role 
of the ‘ubiquitous curator’ presented earlier: John 
Cage’s exhibition Rolywholyover: A Circus for Museum by John 
Cage, and  do it by Hans Ulrich Obrist. These instances 
demonstrate similar issues of order, determinism, 
agency and subjectivity as the generative examples in 
chapter 2.3. Accordingly, they will be later examined 
to accentuate the relationship of generating and 
curating.
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 > John Cage’s3 curatorial exhibition, Rolywholyover: A Circus for 
Museum by John Cage in 1994 (figure 3.1) was composed of 
four smaller, independent exhibitions. Two of these, 
Museumcircle and Circus illustrated Cage’s infatuation 
with randomly generated content: In Museumcircle Cage 
invited museums in the vicinity of the gallery 
to submit a listing of ten objects which could be 
borrowed for the exhibition. The displayed artefacts 
were then chosen by selecting one item from each list 
by chance operations4. The method for selection in 
Circus followed a more traditional curatorial practice, 
being based on Cage’s professional opinion and 
subjective taste. However, if the original piece could 
not be obtained, Cage exhibited replicas produced with 
the permission and instructions of the artist. Also 
the approach for the presentation of the exhibition 
was exceptional: the artefacts were rearranged daily 
according another chance operation. This resulted 
in a constant alteration of context and a multitude 
of possible readings, since the traditional linear 
narrative of the exhibition arrangement was disrupted.
 > Another insightful example of contemporary curatorial 
practice is the  do it project initiated by Hans Ulrich 
Obrist in 1993. Obrist invited artists to write 
instructions for the production of artworks as a kind 
of a ‘score’ for the exhibition. These instructions 
were printed as a book and distributed to various 
galleries and museums in several countries, where 
they were interpreted and enacted anew in succeeding 
iterations. ( O’Neill, 2012: 103) Obrist ( 2015: 30-31) explains 
the guidelines of the  do it exhibitions as follows:
Realizing the artworks, in the sense of actually 
executing the instructions, was left to the public 
or museum staff. The artists who originated the 
instructions were not allowed to be involved: there 
3 As a composer and artist, Cage ( 1912—1992) is known for his groundbreaking 
work in the field of generative music.
4 The nature of the specific chance operations used by Cage in this instance is 
unclear. However, Cage often utilised I Ching, the ancient Chinese method of 
divination, which provides apparently random numbers. ( Marshall, nd) 
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would be no artist-produced ‘original’ that might be 
considered the ‘correct’ version, and no traditional 
artist’s signature. … Also, the components from 
which the works were made were, at the end of the 
exhibition, had to be returned to their original 
context, making  do it completely reversible … At 
the end of each  do it exhibition, the institution 
presenting the show was thus obliged to dismantle or 
otherwise destroy not only the artworks but also the 
instructions by which they were created, which also 
removed the possibility of the artworks becoming part 
of a permanent collection.  do it appeared, but only in 
order to disappear. …  do it was unconcerned with the 
notion of the ‘signed original’, and its opposite, the 
reproduction or copy – the idea was to focus on the 
different interpretations. … Every realization of  do it 
was temporary: an arrangement in space and an activity 
in time.
 > Both of these examples illustrate the dematerialised 
quality of modern curating: the physical artwork 
is surpassed by the concept and the process. 
Consequently, the role of the artist as the author 
and owner of the artwork is diminished, either 
by removing the agency of the artist altogether, 
like in  do it and Circus, or undermining the artist’s 
intention and sovereignty by randomising the context 
and participation, as in Museumcircle. The post-
object perspective is also evident in the ways 
these exhibitions treat originality and material 
limitations: in Circus, unobtainable artworks were 
replaced by replicas, and in  do it, the artworks were 
treated as mere temporary materialisations of the 
idea. Despite not being digital or immaterial, they 
truly are both examples of the ’flux of postmodern 
culture’: complex, dynamic systems of changing 
contexts and contents.
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4  Generating  
and curating: 
The framework 
& the wanderer
4.1  VIRTUALITIES TRANSFORMED
 > Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the main aspects of 
generating and curating discourses. This chapter aims 
to create a synthesis of the aforementioned theories 
by suggesting a joint framework for generating and 
curating (figure 4.2). Each of the four stages of 
the framework proposes a chronological step of the 
combined process, and illustrates the correspondence 
between the two discourses. First, this chapter will 
introduce two theories for creativity, which will 
be accommodated in the framework to demonstrate the 
creative potential arising from the combination of 
generating and curating.
 > The elusive nature of creativity has inspired 
countless attempts for scientific and subjective 
definitions. The more in-depth analysis of the 
discourse is outside the scope of this thesis, so 
this chapter will focus on Deleuze’s concept of 
virtuality ( Deleuze, 1991; Brassett and Marenko, 2015), and 
the Creative System by Boden ( 1990, 1994) and Wiggins 
( 2001, 2003), which both provide particular insight 
to the characteristics of generative and curatorial 
processes.
 > Deleuze ( 1991) states, that creativity is always about 
virtualities being actualised. ‘The virtual’ here 
denotes the vast, immaterial cloud of possibilities 
surrounding each process of production. Actualisation 
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contracts the virtual to actual, pinning down 
a possibility to the present material reality. 
Brassett and Marenko ( 2015: 17-18) paraphrase Deleuze 
by stating that actualisation is the process which 
‘engenders the emergence of new forms’ from the 
‘container of manifold tendencies’ of the virtual. 
Brassett and Marenko ( 2015: 17-18) also remind, 
that the transformation from virtual to actual is 
‘problematic and problematising’, since it allows 
only a limited number of possibilities to be realised. 
It is, however, creative precisely because of this 
persistence of proposing questions: actualisation 
functions as a filter between ‘what is and what could 
be’ ( Brassett and Marenko, 2015: 18).
 > The Creative System introduced by Boden ( 1990, 1994), 
elaborated by Wiggins ( 2001, 2003), and discussed here 
after the example of McLean ( 2011), demonstrates the 
characteristics of a creative process with logical 
operators ( Figure 4.1). U denotes the universe of all 
possible concepts, that is the imaginary group of 
every conceivable solution to all possible creative 
problems. R is the set of rules which define the 
appropriate concepts for the particular problem at 
hand. C defines the ‘conceptual space’, which is the 
group of concepts that are relevant to the subject 
matter by rule R. The conceptual space thus contains 
all the possible solutions for the current creative 
problem. T is the set of rules which define the 
behaviour of a creative agent as it traverses the 
conceptual space. T therefore describes the method 
that is used to find suitable solutions from C. E, 
on the other hand, is the set of rules by which the 
creative agent evaluates the concepts found in C. 
Thus E describes the qualitative or quantitative 
conditions that the artist/designer poses for the 
optimal solution. The act of creation according to 
the Creative System then functions as follows: the 
creative agent ( that is, the artist/designer/curator) 
explores C with the search strategy defined in T and 
then evaluates the findings with E to define the best 
creation. This typical implementation of the creative 
process is called exploratory creativity by Boden and Wiggins. 
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1 EXPLORATORY CREATIVITY
The creative agent traverses the conceptual 
space C with the method defined in T. 
Among the appropriate concepts ( here denoted 
with C1 — C4 )  the creative agent discovers 
the optimal concept ( C4 ) which fits the 
conditions in E.
2 TRANSFORMATIONAL   
CREATIVITY
The rules in T are revised, so that the new 
search method Tr takes the creative agent 
outside the conceptual space. The creative 
agent discovers an invalid concept Ci , which 
however fits the conditions in E.
Evaluation criteria
Figure 4.1
The Creative System introduced by Boden ( 1990, 1994) and elaborated by Wiggins 
( 2001, 2003) describes two types of creativity: ( 1) exploratory creativity and ( 2) 
transformational creativity.
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However, the Creative System recognises also another 
form of the creative process, called transformational 
creativity: The creative agent traverses outside C and 
finds an invalid concept Ci, which is not defined by 
R. Wiggins ( 2001, 2003) calls this inapplicable concept 
aberration. The aberration is, however, valued by the 
rules in E, which means that C should be enlarged to 
include Ci. Therefore the discovery of the valuable but 
invalid concept Ci transforms the entire creative space, 
which makes the results of transformative creativity 
more unexpected ( and thus creative) than those of 
exploratory creativity.
4.2  FRAMEWORK FOR GENERATING AND CURATING
4.2.1 Formalising & delineating
 > Instigating either a generative or a curatorial process 
requires the formalisation of a decisive rule. In 
generative processes this rule reconstructs the design 
problem or artistic idea to a language which can be 
acted upon by the process. This could mean writing an 
algorithm, like in Rosebush’s Letter Field, or devising a 
physical system, like Knowles’s Tree drawings. Likewise 
in curating, the rule defines the operators or the 
selection criteria which guide the formation of the 
collection, such as the instructions for artworks 
and guidelines for the exhibition in Obrist’s  do 
it. The selection criteria can be unambiguous and 
quantitative, such as a certain historical period, 
or vague, qualitative, and based on a subjective 
opinion. The generative or curatorial rule can be 
described by R in the Creative System, which limits 
the appropriate concepts C from the universe of all 
possible solutions. The conceptual space C can be seen 
as consisting of the ‘entities’ of the process, defined 
by Dorin et al. The rule describes the entities by 
their attributes or altering states, thus evoking the 
‘species’ of the outcome. This makes the decisive rule 
very similar to the concept of the ‘genome’ in genetic 
algorithms, such as the ‘artificial DNA’ of a lamp in 
Soddu’s Argenia.
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 > In curatorial context, the entities in the conceptual 
space can be an imaginary group of all items outlined 
by the selection criteria or operators: artworks 
with a specific theme, digital items with a certain 
hashtag, or a more distinct group qualified by the 
rule, such as the list of 10 possible objects from 
each museum in Cage’s Museumcircle. The formalisation 
of the curatorial or generative rule can thus be 
considered as ‘metadesign’ for the forthcoming 
process itself. This delineating of conceivable 
solutions in the form of a rule also represents 
Deleuze’s ‘virtual’: the pool of possible actualities 
not yet realised.
4.2.2 Processing & implementing
 > The generative or curatorial process is the 
implementation of the rules defined in the previous 
step, and functions as the actualisation of Deleuze’s 
‘virtual’. According to Dorin et al., the process 
is the operation which changes the states of the 
entities, such as the cellular automation which 
creates the ‘on-off’ pattern in Fox’s tea cosies, 
or applying the randomly generated values to the 
variable-entities in Rosebush’s Letter Field. Similarly 
the actual process of curation applies the predefined 
operational rules to the available body of content 
( the creative space of entities), consequently 
generating the collection. This can be exemplified by 
the chance operations used by Cage in Museumcircle and 
Circus or the act of creating the artworks in Obrist’s  
do it. In general, any implementation of the curatorial 
selection criteria in the form of filtering, sorting 
or organising is the enactment of the process. This 
procedure of reaching the generative or curatorial 
outcome can be illustrated by T in the Creative 
System: it describes the method of pursuing solutions 
in the creative space and thus, actualising the 
possible.
 > Many generative and curatorial processes are, however, 
able to develop and improve independently, or can 
be adjusted by the creative agent: genetic systems, 
content curation algorithms, randomised processes 
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and procedural curatorial methods employed by Cage 
and Obrist, exhibit either autonomy or interaction, 
or both. As the generative or curatorial process is 
modified, the rules in T are altered accordingly. 
Consequently, the revised Tr allows the creative agent 
to traverse outside the initial area of C, and thus 
find the unexpected, aberrational solution Ci. This is 
how self-directing or interactive processes exhibit 
transformational creativity. 
 > Deleuze’s concept of ‘the event’ illustrates the 
characteristically dynamic and indeterministic nature 
of generative and curatorial processes: ‘Objects 
come to exist not out of a predetermination, as a 
compound of matter and form, but as the outcome 
of the continuity and variation of matter captured 
as a specific type of individuation: the event.’ 
( Marenko, 2015: 117) The product of the process is not 
necessarily set and stable, but a ‘temporal expression 
of an event-affect continuum’ ( Marenko, 2015: 112), the 
actualisation of the virtual, constantly interacted, 
evaluated and evolved.
4.2.3 Interacting & evaluating
 > The immediate results of the generative process can, 
at least in theory, number to infinite. Therefore 
some kind of method for assessing and filtering the 
outcomes is necessary. It could be an in-built system 
of evaluation, like the ‘fitness function’ in genetic 
algorithms, or an interactive procedure carried out 
by the artist/designer. The evaluation method depends 
on the ambiguity of the design problem at hand: if an 
‘optimal’ solution can be defined, the quantitative 
valuation of the outcomes is a mechanical task of 
computation, such as defining the final shape of NASA’s 
evolutionary antenna. However, if the ideal product can 
not be incontrovertibly5 described, which often is the 
case especially in the context of art, assessment is 
an exercise of personal taste, values, or intuition, 
that is, a form of curating. As an example, we can 
5 In regard of algorithms, this usually means numerically.
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The proposed framework for generating and curating.
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surmise that the version of Rosebush’s Letter Field in 
figure 2.4. is one of the many iterations produced by 
the randomised algorithm, subsequently hand-picked 
for display by the artist. This method of evaluation, 
which is the essence of curating and indispensable 
to generating, can be described by E in the Creative 
System. The evaluation criteria established in 
E defines the final product of the curatorial or 
generative process among the possible items in C. By 
selecting the ultimate product, the creative agent thus 
interacts with the outcomes of the process.
 > Interaction can also happen directly with the 
process itself. This manipulation of the system is 
illustrated by the ‘environmental interaction’ defined 
by Dorin et al. The interaction can be continuous, 
indeterministic and intertwined with the process, like 
the effect of wind on the tree branches in Knowles’s 
Tree drawings, or it can happen as discrete events, such 
as the evaluation of the subsequent generations in 
genetic algorithms. In this case, evaluation is used 
to tweak the process, and indirectly, the products, 
towards a more desirable outcome. This feedback loop 
of repeatedly evaluating the results and revising the 
process, and thus increasing the fitness of every 
subsequent generation, is typical to a variety of 
generative processes, not only genetic algorithms. 
 > Also in the curatorial context, ‘environmental 
interaction’ can be an integral part of the process, 
like the daily rearranging of objects in Cage’s Circus, 
or artworks produced interactively with the museum 
visitors in Obrist’s  do it. In general, any alterations 
made to the curated collection, such as addition or 
removal of the items, is an act of evaluation and 
interaction. In curation as well, evaluation of items 
can lead to tweaking of the process in the manner 
of a feedback loop. This, again, takes the form of 
transformational creativity: if the creative agent finds a 
valuable concept outside the conceptual space, the 
rules of the process ( an thus, the limits of the 
conceptual space) have to be revised. Accordingly, 
if a curator includes an ‘aberrational’ item to the 
collection, the formative rules of the collection are 
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reconstructed, which increases the number of possible 
additions. As an example, in digital content curation 
the input and interaction of the user-curator alters 
the results of the quasi-curatorial algorithms: liking 
a video on YouTube changes the generated collection 
of suggested videos, which leads to successive 
discoveries.
 > It is notable here, that the acts of evaluation 
and interaction always require an entity outside 
the process itself: it could be an indeterministic 
external force, such as the wind, or an intentional 
subject, like our creative agent, but nevertheless, 
the generative or curatorial process can not function 
completely independently. Even in autonomous systems, 
such as genetic algorithms, where the evaluation 
and tweaking of the process is outsourced to the 
system itself, the creative agent has to devise the 
evaluation criteria. In addition, the instigating of 
the process and presenting of the outcomes require 
some form of outside interaction. 
 > In effect, the requirement of agency is what gives 
rise to creativity. Deleuze ( 1991: 15) recognises the 
creative value of evaluating and interacting, even if 
( or because) an absolute, optimal solution can not 
be reached: ‘True freedom lies in a power to decide, 
to constitute problems themselves … it is a question 
of finding the problem and consequently of positing 
it, even more than solving it’. It is the process, 
the ’event’, the flux of information and matter, 
which breeds creation: ‘Deleuze compares the force 
of inventing concepts to a feedback loop, to an echo 
chamber, where in order to get moving an idea has to 
traverses [sic] different filters, different fields.’ 
( Brassett and Marenko, 2015: 15). This well-established idea 
of the journey eclipsing the destination emphasises 
the importance of the process in generative and 
curatorial practices.
4.2.4  Translating & presenting
 > Despite the dematerialised, event-based and ‘virtual’ 
nature of generative and curatorial practices, the 
perceivable outcomes of the process are still perhaps 
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the most evident constituent of any act of generation 
or curation. The experienced products, or ’sensory 
outcomes’ defined by Dorin et al., can be the final 
results of a terminated process, where the ‘optimal’ 
( or subjectively most highly valued) creation has been 
reached by some method of evaluation, or the process 
has been been otherwise brought to conclusion. Again, 
the termination point of the process might be inherent 
to the system, like when a generative algorithm has 
been successfully completed by the computer, or it can 
be an arbitrary artistic choice, such as the instance 
when the artworks in Knowles’s Tree drawings were deemed 
‘finished’. The outcome of the generative process 
can also be a snapshot-like record of some stage 
of the process, in the manner of the fixed cellular 
automation pattern in Fox’s tea cosies. Because of the 
tendency of generative processes to produce slightly 
varied, unique outcomes, multiple results are often 
exhibited side by side in the manner of a curated 
collection, exemplified by the presentation of Soddu’s 
generated lamp designs.
 > The collection, which is the outcome of a curatorial 
process, embodies its selection criteria and 
formative operations. In the context of the art 
world, this group of items often takes the form 
of a temporary exhibition, such as Obrist’s  do it 
and Cage’s Rolywholyover, or more traditionally, the 
permanent collection of a museum. In content curation, 
this collection can be any kind of compilation of 
items—material, digital, or conceptual—a playlist, 
a catalogue of blog articles or a listing of film 
recommendations. Similarly to generating, the outcome 
of the curatorial process is not necessarily stable 
and set, but can be continuously or discretely altered 
by an evaluating feedback loop or some form of 
interaction, described in the previous step.
 > The question of how the outcomes are presented is, 
however, even more urgent than the question of 
which outcomes are presented. In some generative 
processes, such as Knowles’s Tree drawings, the form of 
the perceptible outcomes is inherent to the generative 
system, and the process is ‘designed to match the 
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ontology of the intended outcome’ ( Dorin et al., 2012: 249). 
There are, of course, artistic choices, such as the 
selection of the drawing method, but the ‘data’ of the 
process ( the movement of the branches by the wind) is 
nevertheless translated directly to a visible output 
( the markings of the drawing utensil on the surface).
 > If the generative process does not have an inherent, 
experienced outcome, which often is the case with 
digital methods, the results have to be ’mapped’, 
in other words, rendered perceivable, by some 
means. McCormac et al. ( 2014: 137) write about the 
necessity of mapping in virtual processes: ‘Unless 
software design is conceptualized directly at the 
level of individual bits, it is impossible to write 
a computer program without recourse to some form 
of representation.’ They continue by stating, that 
generative art often mimics scientific mapping 
methods, because of their adeptness in simulating 
real-life processes. Dorin et al ( 2012: 249) point out, 
that the protocols of modern computation rely heavily 
on screen-based presentations as the most ‘natural’ 
way of representing the imperceptible machine states 
of bits. Nevertheless, if the artist/designer decides 
to deviate from this customary method of simulative 
presentation towards an arbitrary physical mapping, 
the options are practically unlimited. For example, 
Fox’s tea cosies adopt the unrelated materiality 
of knitting to represent the binary states of the 
cellular automation. This translation from abstract to 
tangible is thus perhaps the most creative choice in 
the generative process. 
 > The creative potential of a curated collection 
similarly emerges from the presentation of the 
collection: it is not only the items itself, but 
the relationships created between the items, that gives 
birth to the reading of the whole. The curator can 
manipulate these relationships by juxtaposing, 
contextualising and contrasting the items, 
demonstrated by the randomised, daily changing 
arrangement of the collection in Cage’s Circus. 
Filipovic ( 2006: 77) describes, how the presentation 
can completely alter the way the collection is 
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experienced: ‘Exhibition is the form of its arguments, 
but its very premises ( classificatory systems, logic 
and structure) can be unhinged by the artwork that 
defies the context.’ An demonstrative example of the 
power of presentation and context would be Eduardo 
Paolozzi’s exhibition Lost Magic Kingdoms and Six Paper Moons 
from Nahuatl ( 1986) at the Museum of Mankind in London. 
Paolozzi, an artist focused on collages and pop 
art, selected anonymous ethnographic items from the 
archives of the anthropological museum, and combined 
them into imaginative assemblages ( Napier, 1992: 71, figure 
4.3). In the permanent collection of the museum, the 
exact same objects would be representatives of their 
cultural origins, but in Paolozzi’s exhibition they 
were now transformed into a medium of the artist’s 
creative expression. The connotations projected by 
the items, as religious artefacts, practical tools 
or emblems of power, were eclipsed by their physical 
characteristics in the visual narratives fabricated by 
the artist/curator. 
 > As in Fox’s tea cosies, where the choice of mapping 
( knitted household objects) provides an unexpected 
and distinctive visual and conceptual experience of 
the immaterial process ( cellular automata), similarly 
in curation the ‘mapping’, consisting of the order, 
arrangement and exhibiting of the items, creates 
the aesthetic and thematic entity. In the art world 
example of an exhibition, the presentation of the 
curated collection could involve the exhibition 
venue itself; the way the artworks are spatially and 
temporally located; the method of their mounting and 
display; the signage, labelling and other extraneous 
material; and finally, the naming, conceptual framing 
and public communicating of the exhibition. In this 
case, the presentation of the results of a generative 
process could also be considered as a two-tiered 
operation. First, establishing the actual ‘mapping’ 
of the system; the technique of representing the data 
in a perceptible form, and secondly, deciding on the 
method and style of exhibiting the mapped results. 
As an example, Soddu used 3D computer graphics for 
rendering ( ‘mapping’) his generated lamp designs, and 
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then exhibited the various results compiled in a grid 
( figure 2.5.). Knowles’s Tree drawings, on the other hand, 
used a method of mapping which was already prescribed 
by the process: the pen markings on the paper. ( figure 
2.3.) The various generated ( and subsequently curated) 
results were, again, exhibited side by side and along 
with photographed records of the process ( figure 4.4).
 > In effect, the concept of ‘mapping’ provides an 
interesting analogue in the curatorial context: 
O’Neill ( 2012) compares the practice of curating to 
map drawing: discovering connections between concepts 
and translating them to the spatial and material 
dimensions of the collection. Therefore the curated 
collection can be considered as a ‘simulation of 
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real-life interrelations’, much like the mapping 
of a generative process. The notion of mapping as 
concept-connecting is even more prevalent in modern 
content curation. As discussed in chapter 3.2., the 
hypertextual nature of online spaces encourages 
linking and cross-referencing, thus leading to 
conceptual map-networks that transcend all physical 
dimensions.
 > In conclusion, the exhibited form of the generated 
or curated product is an exercise of subjective 
creativity. If the method of presentation can 
completely alter the experienced outcome, what 
responsibilities and opportunities does that inflict 
on the creative agent? If the curator is able to 
re-appropriate items by manipulating their contexts, 
do they cease to be a curator and become an author? 
Or, as McCormac et al. ( 2014: 137) point out, ‘If 
generative art uses real-world data, what are the 
ethical and political implications of the artist’s 
chosen representations?’ In general, curating and 
generating raise several urgent question about agency, 
intention and power, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
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5 Author or 
Mediator? 
5.1 EQUILIBRIUM OF INTENTION
 > The topics of agency and authorship in generating and 
curating have been touched upon several times in the 
previous chapters. In chapter 2.2 it was stated that 
in generative art the artist often strives to reduce 
their intention by using autonomous, indeterministic 
processes. Chapter 2.3 elaborated on this idea by 
explaining how different types of randomisation, 
environmental interaction or self-evolving processes 
can be used as a means for reaching emergent and 
unpredictable outcomes. Accordingly, chapter 3.3 
described examples from contemporary curating, where 
the curator has disrupted the traditional role of 
the curator, first by reducing the autonomy and 
authorship of the artist, and secondly, by introducing 
randomisation and interaction to the process as a 
means for eliminating their own intention. However, 
chapter 4 illustrated how the agency of the creative 
agent can never be completely erased: formulating 
the rules of the system, evaluating the results, and 
devising a method for exhibiting the outcomes require 
the creative agent’s intention, even if the process 
itself might be autonomous. Soddu (2006: np) describes 
this unavoidable subjectivity in regard to genetic 
algorithms, but the same applies for curating: ’As 
all creative processes it involves subjectivity in 
the definition of how the process runs and how the 
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transforming rules are created and organized into 
a system.’
 > Even with the growing acknowledgement of the curator’s 
authorship and agency (discussed in chapter 3.2), the role of 
the curator is still essentially that of a mediator. 
An artist can also act as a curator, exemplified by 
Cage’s and Paolozzi’s curatorial exhibitions, but in 
that capacity they do not craft or produce as such, 
but convey and translate by using someone else’s work 
as their medium. In the making of the collection and 
the arrangement, the curator proposes a reading for 
the artworks (Filipovic, 2013: 77), and thus they have the 
ability to insert their own message in the collection. 
Obrist (2015: 46, original emphasis) describes how, since the 
rise of thematic exhibitions in the 1980s, the curator 
has been seen as ‘an overriding figure or auteur who 
uses artwork to illustrate his or her own theory’. 
As an opposition to the dubious notion of curator-
as-appropriator, Obrist’s mentor, curator Kasper 
König has stated that ‘it is not the job of a curator 
to impose their own signature but to be a mediator 
between artist and public’ (Obrist, 2015: 132).
 > In generative art and design, questions of agency 
and intention have been widely discussed, especially 
in regard to computer-generation. We can expand this 
discussion to include also curating, if we regard 
curating as an analogy to programming6 along the 
lines of the framework introduced in chapter 4: the 
curator translates their idea into a rule, a sort 
of ‘intuitive algorithm’, which is then communicated 
through the collection. Similarly, a programmer 
expresses their idea in a programming language, 
which is then compiled to execute the algorithm. Cox 
(2006: 75) describes how ‘programmed art is action 
that is conceived in advance of it’s execution’. This 
can also be applied to curating: the rules of the 
process precede the actualised collection. The issues 
of intention and agency in curating verge on those 
6 Interestingly enough, ’programming’ is used as a curatorial term, in the 
purpose of devising a programme for a museum. (Hernández, 2013)
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in generating even more closely, if we consider the 
contemporary modes of content curating which take 
place online through programmed algorithms.
 > Several writers claim that all algorithmic designs 
are extensions of the programmer’s intention, since 
a computer program essentially is a codification of 
intent (Cox, 2006: 75; Maeda, 1999: 217; Soddu, 2006: np). Maeda 
(1999: 217) points out, along the lines of chapter 4, 
that human intention is at least required to initiate 
an otherwise autonomous process:
Computation is a means for defining systems 
of change. … Even when you are designing 
computational forms that transform in ways beyond 
your control, never forget that it is you, not the 
computer, who is affecting the change. Left alone, a 
computer would never initiate change because it does 
not have intent.
 > However, this claim for programmer’s intention raises 
further questions: what if the creative agent does 
not personally author the program? As discussed in 
the introduction, many artists and designers are 
disinclined to devise their own generative systems, 
but result to customary, widely-used algorithms and 
simulations, such as L-systems and cellular automata. 
Or alternatively, the creative agent themself might 
devise the functionalities of the system, but then 
require the assistance of a programmer for translating 
the rules to a logical language. Is it then essential 
to understand the inner workings of an algorithm 
for claiming the authorship of its results? On that 
account, McCormac et al. (2014: 136) remind that it is 
almost impossible for the programmer to completely 
comprehend and predict the behaviour of complex 
software—this is why programs have ‘bugs’. McCormac 
et al. continue with a statement which objects Maeda’s 
view of computers as passive executors of commands:
Computers have already demonstrated the ability to 
originate something: to exceed their programmers’ 
anticipations or knowledge. Indeed, this potential for 
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“emergence” is the basis for many an artist’s decision 
to use the computer. As computers have developed, 
we have seen our relationship with them change and 
the computer’s role shift from that of a “tool” under 
the direct control of the artist to that of a collaborator 
or creative partner and, potentially, an autonomously 
creative entity.
 > If computerised processes might be considered 
autonomous entities according to McCormac et al., is 
the creative agent then stripped of all agency in the 
end? One could argue not. If it is the intention of the 
creative agent to shift the agency to the autonomous 
system, is not the role of the system then reduced to 
that of a tool? Marshall (nd, np) notes, amusingly but 
accurately, how Cage’s reliance in chance operations 
in music composing became so compulsive, that nothing 
was left to chance. If randomness becomes this kind 
of an artistic trademark, is it not then the very 
manifestation of agency and intent?
 > One could also insist that as a subjective act of 
evaluating, curating must require human agency. 
However, curating can be—and on some level already 
is—highly automated and computerised: quasi-
curatorial algorithms that filter and organise 
content online can recognise and classify material 
through hashtags, contexts, or other metadata. 
These autonomous curator-generators can roam the 
virtual realm with speed and accuracy impossible 
to human agents. Nevertheless, this argument boils 
down to the (present) inability of computers to 
spontaneously initiate anything. A computer could 
recognise an image of cat through modern-technology 
computer vision, it could teach itself to identify 
increasingly varied pictures of cats, it could start 
a collection of cat images, and it could even rate 
the images with the help of peer-reviews, but someone 
would have to tell the computer to do so. Also any 
other multifaceted or more abstract topics or complex 
conceptual ideas, which seem to be prevalent in 
modern collections, would be beyond the abilities of 
present softwares.
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 > In conclusion, curating and generating both 
perform on the vague borderline of intention and 
indeterminism. They require subjectivity and human 
agency in some phases, but in others the autonomous 
process might take over and provide indeterministic 
results. The unintentionality of the results might be 
‘intentional’—designed and delineated by the creator—
or caused by the complexity of the process that 
exceeds the creators understanding: a ‘bug’ or other 
unpredictable event. These unintentional solutions are 
the ‘aberrations’ described in the Creative System: 
unexpected and technically invalid solutions, which 
exhibit transformational creativity. So the creative 
agent has to devise a curatorial or generative system 
which balances intention—the desired characteristics 
of the outcome—and indeterminism—an emergent and 
unpredictable outcome. Thus, one could say that 
creativity is about creating a system that helps 
imagine unimaginable outcomes.
5.2 WHO CURATES THE CURATORS, WHAT GENERATES THE GENERATORS?
 > The discussion of agency and intention in generating 
and curating naturally raises questions of moral 
nature, in regard to power and authority. As was 
alluded in the previous chapter, the act of curating 
is never completely neutral, because it requires 
subjectivity and thus reflects subjective values and 
opinions. Filipovic (2013: 74) describes the curated 
exhibition as ‘a scrim on which ideology is projected, 
a machine for the manufacture of meaning, a theatre 
of bourgeois culture, a site for the disciplining of 
citizen-subjects, or a mise-en-scène of unquestioned 
values’. As gatekeepers of taste and value, curators 
curate culture and history: they decide what is 
saved, maintained and appraised, and how it is framed 
and presented. Fortunately, the proliferation of 
virtual material and online tools has heterogenised 
and enriched the participants of cultural curation 
from predominantly western academics to anyone with 
internet access. Contemporary art and curation are 
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both characterised by this immaterial production of 
value and ‘processing, circulation and development 
of soft materials such as communication and data’ 
(Lillemose, 2006: 120). This aspect of curating and 
generating is also described by Borriaud’s (2002: 
113) concept of ‘relational aesthetics’: ‘a set of 
artistic practices which take as their theoretical 
and practical point of departure the whole of 
human relations and their social context, rather 
than an independent and private space.’ Similarly, 
Vishmid (2006: 42) reminds us that because of being 
information-based, generated internet art is not 
traceable to a single authoring subjectivity. The 
same applies to curating: independently curated 
online collections function outside institutions and 
are run by individuals (Paul, 2006: 93), in a way that 
communalises the curatorial power from the ideological 
establishment to anonymous masses. 
 > Despite the apparent communalising and emancipating 
force of immateriality, Goriunova and Shulgin (2006: 
238) accurately point out that software is never 
a culturally, socially or aesthetically neutral 
layer between human and computer. For example, 
the persistent gender imbalance in the field of 
computer science shapes the syntax and the tools we 
use, thus affecting the experience of our existence 
in the digital realm. One could also state that 
the false conviction that quantitatively optimal, 
computer-generated outcomes are intrinsically and 
universally virtuous overlooks the exclusiveness 
of such solutions. Soddu (2006: np) describes how 
a design approach focused on optimisation assumes 
that ‘all people are equal, all people need the same 
equal product’. Slater (2006: 141) expresses a similar 
frustration towards the assumed virtuousness of the 
virtual:
Informatic globalisation is ceaselessly paradoxical; 
affording glimmers of freedom, connection and 
empowerment whilst simultaneously collapsing such mass 
intellectuality into the grid of appropriation and control.
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 > Even well-meaning instances of curatorial and 
algorithmic control can turn into totalitarian 
nightmares: Feuz (2011: np) has studied how user-
customised search result in search engines can be a 
threat to the free circulation of information, since 
they filter the available material with possibly 
suspect principles. As immateriality displaces 
value from object to process (Vishmid, 2006: 40) and 
while interaction, appropriation and collaboration 
destabilise the concepts of authority and ownership 
in online curating and generating, new economies and 
systems of control are bound to be created. However, 
it is very unlikely that copyright laws, watermarks, 
or subscription fees can stop the ‘generalised 
creativity’ of curating and generating taking place in 
online galleries, meme sites and social media. Slater 
(2006: 144) calls this commodifying and hybridising of 
aesthetic experiences an ‘unassignable leakage’:
disorientation produced by the proliferation of nodes 
of (immaterial) production and mediation (weblogs, 
free software communities, community WIFI networks, 
peer-2-peer file sharing, community media projects, 
street TV, auto-labs, etc.) which is unleashing a 
generalised creativity unconcerned with the categorical 
definitions of art. Somewhere, out there, everywhere 
and anywhere, art within immaterial production is 
mingling with all these creative efforts, swapping its 
DNA, in ways that are simply uncuratable because 
they have been incorporated into other economies 
of, one hopes transformative, desiring-production. 
This is not relational aesthetics or even Net Art, but 
something else which defies categorisation because it is 
multitudinous and mutant; an ‘unassignable leakage’.
53
54
6  Conclusions
6.1 RULES OF EMERGENCE
 > Despite the apparent discreteness of generating and 
curating, they in fact share many characteristics, 
both practical and conceptual. A defining similarity 
between the practices is the establishing of the rule: a 
formula which translates the intuitive or ideal to the 
language of logic. The creative agent devises the rules 
of the process instead of designing the outcome, a method 
that bestows autonomy and emergence on the process. 
This aspect of advocating ‘metadesign’ over design 
dematerialises the disciplines: generating and curating 
become fluctuating systems and complex processes, 
‘events’ described by Deleuze, not just manifestations 
of design products, artworks or collections. Marenko 
(2015: 111-112, emphasis added) paraphrases Deleuze:
The object, writes Deleuze, has a new status. No longer 
confined within the mould that has created it, it has 
become an event continually modulated in time. … 
The object ceases being the fixed representation of a 
relation between matter and form to become instead 
the temporal expression of an event-affect-continuum, 
that is, the active and affective dynamism that 
permeates matter.
 > Deleuze describes how events propagate from chaos 
through a ‘great screen’ or ‘universal sieve’. This 
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sieve-membrane filters the incoming chaos of data into 
an operational event (Marenko, 2015: 120-121), much like 
the act of curating determines relevant material among 
the possible concepts. Deleuze’s dichotomy of ‘the 
virtual’ and ‘the actual’ describes this realisation 
of potentials well: in generating and curating, 
perceptible entities, such as design products, 
artworks and collections, are actualisations of the 
virtuality of the rules. The creative agent devises 
the ‘species’ of the outcome, and lets the process 
give birth to the individuals.
 > In face of the emergent and indeterministic 
autonomy of the process, the creative agent still 
has to claim their agency. The establishing of 
the formative rules, the evaluating of the items, 
the subsequent interaction with the system, and 
the exhibiting of the results all require human 
intention and creativity. Generative and curatorial 
processes often entail a feedback loop, where the 
input and interaction of the creative agent tweaks 
the process, and indirectly the products, towards a 
more desirable outcome. This revising of the process 
requires evaluation of the products, that is, a form 
of curating. Adapting the rules of the process alters 
the possible outcomes—thus the process exhibits 
transformational creativity described by Boden and 
Wiggins. In effect, the true creative potential of 
generative art and design arises from the stages 
where curatorial control is present, not from the 
algorithmic process itself. Likewise, curation can 
not exist only as a set of selective rules, but 
requires the generative implementation of the rules; 
the other half of the feedback loop. Thus, curating 
and generating both supervene on and contain each 
other like an ever-enfolding fractal pattern.
 > Because of the required human agency, even 
autonomous curatorial and generative processes 
display characteristics of both intention and 
indeterminism: the decision to use techniques with 
emergent properties, such as randomisation, is of 
course intentional, while the way the technique 
is implemented and how the results are presented, 
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requires another kind of intention. For reaching 
creative emergence, the curatorial or generative 
process has to balance intention—the desired 
characteristics of the results—and indeterminism—
unpredictable and destabilising forces. Thus, 
creativity is about creating a system that helps 
imagine unimaginable outcomes: writing the rules of 
emergence.
6.2 FURTHER QUESTIONS
 > Questions of agency and power in generating and 
curating provide a fruitful ground for further 
research. Especially the globalisation of information 
and valorisation of immaterial objects and immaterial 
processes affect both practices drastically. Hannah 
Arendt’s7 ideas of action, labour and power, arising 
from the plurality of human relationships would offer 
interesting theoretical frames for addressing these 
questions.
 > One could criticise this thesis by arguing that the 
research should have discussed some exemplifying, 
existing initiatives that combine curating and 
generating, such as the Kurator8 application. 
Kurator lets users to discover, identify and purchase 
artworks through the mobile applications image 
recognition software (Kurator, nd). These kinds of 
technology-driven tools for generative curatorial 
practices are sure to proliferate in the future, and 
possess great potential for novel implementations 
of curating and generating. However, the aim of 
this thesis is to find abstract connections between 
the acts of generating and curating and introduce 
new modes of thought for designers, artist, and 
curators, not necessarily to find direct, concrete 
applications. Because creating is, in Deleuze’s 
terms, about inventing new languages for proposing 
7 See for example d’Entreves (2006). 
8 See http://wekurate.xyz/
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questions, not about finding solutions (Brasset and 
Marenko, 2015: 19):
Positing a problem has therefore to do with invention, 
rather than uncovering solutions that already exist; 
it is about creating the space, the milieu in which 
problems may become, along with the solutions that 
go with them. It is about creating the terms by which 
a problem will be stated. Problems have no given 
solution; they must generate solutions by a process 
whereby what did not exist, what might never have 
happened, is invented.
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The image on the cover was created with the enclosed algorithm. First, the algorithm was 
used to generate thirty candidates, from which the fifteen images displayed on the back 
cover were curated. For each of the three printed copies of this thesis, one of the images was 
selected for the cover.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Rules of Emergence</title>
<meta charset=”utf-8”>
<meta name=”viewport” content=”width=device-width, user-
scalable=no, minimum-scale=1.0, maximum-scale=1.0”>
<script src=”https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/
jquery/3.2.0/jquery.min.js”></script>
<script src=”jquery.halftone.js”></script>
<script type=”text/javascript” src=”paperjs/dist/paper-
full.js”></script> 
<style>
html, body {
  width:  100%;
  height: 100%;
  margin: 0;
}
    
canvas {
position: absolute;
top: 0;
left: 0;
}
</style>    
</head>
<body>
<canvas id=”c”>
</canvas>
<canvas id=”c2”>
</canvas>
<script>
    
var h = window.innerHeight;
var w = h;
    
function random(min,max) //random number generator
{
    return Math.floor(Math.random()*(max-min+1)+min);
}
    
function rcolor() //random color
{
    var r = random(0, 255);
    var g = random(0, 255);
    var b = random(0, 255);
    color=’rgb(‘+r+’,’+g+’,’+b+’)’;
    return color;
}
    
function rd() //random point
{
    var d = random(0, 360);
    return d;
}
    
function rp() //random point
{
    var p = random(w, h);
    return p;
}
    
function rx() //random x-coordinate
{
    var x = random(100,w-100);
    return x;
}
function ry() //random x-coordinate
{
    var y = random(100,h-100);
    return y;
}
function rwh() //random width/height
{
    var wh = random((h*0.1),(h*0.7));
    return wh;
}
function rsw() //random stroke width
{
var w = random(1, 150);
return w;
}
    
function rsw2() //random stroke width
{
var w = random(1, 10);
return w;
}
    
function ri() //random integer
{
    var i = random(1,50);
    return i;
}
    
function ri2() //random integer
{
    var i = random(1,10);
    return i;
}
function ri3() //random integer
{
    var i = random(1,10);
    return i;
}
function ri4() //random integer
{
    var i = random(1,10);
    return i;
}
function ri5() //random integer
{
    var i = Math.random()*random(0,10);
    return i;
}
function ri6() //random integer
{
    var i = Math.random()*random(1,5);
    return i;
}
function ri7() //random integer
{
    var i = Math.random()*random(2,10);
    return i;
}
function ri8() //random integer
{
    var i = Math.random()*random(60,300);
    return i;
}
function ra() //random angle radians
{
    var a = random(1,6);
    return a;
}
    
var canvas = document.getElementById(“c”);
var ctx = canvas.getContext(“2d”);
ctx.canvas.width  = w;
ctx.canvas.height = h;
//ctx.fillStyle=”#ffffff”;
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function drawrec(ctx){ //draw rectangle
    var x1 = rx();
    var y1 = ry();
    var h1 = rwh();
    var w1 = rwh();
    var grd=ctx.createLinearGradient(x1,y1,x1+300,y1);
    grd.addColorStop(1,rcolor());
    grd.addColorStop(0,rcolor());
    ctx.fillStyle=grd;
    ctx.fillRect(x1,y1,500,500);
}
function drawcurve(ctx){ //draw curve
    var x = rx();
    var y = ry();
    var h = rwh();
    var a = ra();
    var a2 = ra();
    var grd=ctx.createLinearGradient(x,y,x+h,y);
    grd.addColorStop(1,rcolor());
    grd.addColorStop(0,rcolor());
    ctx.strokeStyle=grd;
    ctx.lineWidth=rsw();
    ctx.lineCap=”round”;
    ctx.lineJoin=”round”;
    var path = new Path2D();
    path.arc(x,y,h,a,a2);
    ctx.stroke(path);
}
    
function drawbez(ctx) { //draw bezier curve
    var x=rx();
    var y=ry();
    ctx.bezierCurveTo(x,y,x+50,y+50,x,y);
}
function drawblob(ctx) {
    var x = rx();
    var y = ry();
    var h = ri6()*40;
    var d = ri5()*h*0.7;
    var grd=ctx.createRadialGradient(x,y,h,x*2,y*2,2*h);
    grd.addColorStop(1,rcolor());
    grd.addColorStop(0,rcolor());
    ctx.fillStyle=grd;
    var path = new Path2D();
    path.arc(x,y,h,0,10);
    ctx.fill(path);
    ctx.translate(0,d);
    ctx.fill(path);
    ctx.translate(0,d);
    ctx.fill(path);
    ctx.translate(0,d);
}
    
function drawshape(ctx) { //draw custom shape
    var grd=ctx.createLinearGradient(0,0,w,h);
    grd.addColorStop(1,rcolor());
    grd.addColorStop(0,rcolor());
    ctx.lineCap=”round”;
    ctx.lineJoin=”round”;
    ctx.strokeStyle=grd;
    ctx.lineWidth=rsw();
    ctx.beginPath();
    for (i = 0; i < ri7(); i++) { 
    drawbez(ctx);
    }
    ctx.closePath();
    ctx.stroke();
}
    
    drawshape(ctx);
    drawrec(ctx);
    drawcurve(ctx);
    drawblob(ctx);
    </script>    
     
<script type=”text/paperscript” canvas=”c2”>        
    
project.currentStyle = {
 fillColor: ‘black’
};
var ballPositions = [[rx(), ry()], [rx(), ry()], [rx(), 
ry()], [rx(), ry()], [rx(), ry()]];
var handle_len_rate = 2.4;
var circlePaths = [];
var radius = 50;
for (var i = 0, l = ballPositions.length; i < l; i++) {
 var circlePath = new Path.Circle({
  center: ballPositions[i],
  radius: 50
 });
 circlePaths.push(circlePath);
}
var largeCircle = new Path.Circle({
 center: [rx(), ry()],
 radius: 100
});
circlePaths.push(largeCircle);
largeCircle.position = [rx(), ry()];
var connections = new Group();
function generateConnections(paths) {
 // Remove the last connection paths:
 for (var i = 0, l = paths.length; i < l; i++) {
  for (var j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
   var path = 
metaball(paths[i], paths[j], 0.5, handle_len_rate, 300);
   if (path) {
    connections.
appendTop(path);
   }
  }
 }
}
    
generateConnections(circlePaths);
// ---------------------------------------------
function metaball(ball1, ball2, v, handle_len_rate, 
maxDistance) {
 var center1 = ball1.position;
 var center2 = ball2.position;
 var radius1 = ball1.bounds.width / 2;
 var radius2 = ball2.bounds.width / 2;
 var pi2 = Math.PI / 2;
 var d = center1.getDistance(center2);
 var u1, u2;
 if (radius1 == 0 || radius2 == 0)
  return;
 if (d > maxDistance || d <= Math.abs(radius1 - 
radius2)) {
  return;
 } else if (d < radius1 + radius2) { // case 
circles are overlapping
  u1 = Math.acos((radius1 * radius1 + 
d * d - radius2 * radius2) /
    (2 * radius1 * 
d));
  u2 = Math.acos((radius2 * radius2 + 
d * d - radius1 * radius1) /
    (2 * radius2 * 
d));
 } else {
  u1 = 0;
  u2 = 0;
 }
 var angle1 = (center2 - center1).
getAngleInRadians();
 var angle2 = Math.acos((radius1 - radius2) / 
d);
 var angle1a = angle1 + u1 + (angle2 - u1) * v;
 var angle1b = angle1 - u1 - (angle2 - u1) * v;
 var angle2a = angle1 + Math.PI - u2 - (Math.PI 
- u2 - angle2) * v;
 var angle2b = angle1 - Math.PI + u2 + (Math.PI 
- u2 - angle2) * v;
 var p1a = center1 + getVector(angle1a, 
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radius1);
 var p1b = center1 + getVector(angle1b, 
radius1);
 var p2a = center2 + getVector(angle2a, 
radius2);
 var p2b = center2 + getVector(angle2b, 
radius2);
 // define handle length by the distance between
 // both ends of the curve to draw
 var totalRadius = (radius1 + radius2);
 var d2 = Math.min(v * handle_len_rate, (p1a - 
p2a).length / totalRadius);
 // case circles are overlapping:
 d2 *= Math.min(1, d * 2 / (radius1 + radius2));
 radius1 *= d2;
 radius2 *= d2;
 var path = new Path({
  segments: [p1a, p2a, p2b, p1b],
  style: ball1.style,
  closed: true
 });
 var segments = path.segments;
 segments[0].handleOut = getVector(angle1a - 
pi2, radius1);
 segments[1].handleIn = getVector(angle2a + pi2, 
radius2);
 segments[2].handleOut = getVector(angle2b - 
pi2, radius2);
 segments[3].handleIn = getVector(angle1b + pi2, 
radius1);
 return path;
}
// ------------------------------------------------
function getVector(radians, length) {
 return new Point({
  // Convert radians to degrees:
  angle: radians * 180 / Math.PI,
  length: length
 });
}
    
    
</script>
<script>
    
 var bayerThresholdMap = [
  [  15, 135,  45, 165 ],
  [ 195,  75, 225, 105 ],
  [  60, 180,  30, 150 ],
  [ 240, 120, 210,  90 ]
];
var lumR = [];
var lumG = [];
var lumB = [];
for (var i=0; i<256; i++) {
  lumR[i] = i*0.299;
  lumG[i] = i*0.587;
  lumB[i] = i*0.114;
}
function monochrome(imageData, threshold, type){
  var imageDataLength = imageData.data.length;
  // Greyscale luminance (sets r pixels to luminance of 
rgb)
  for (var i = 0; i <= imageDataLength; i += 4) {
    imageData.data[i] = Math.floor(lumR[imageData.data[i]] 
+ lumG[imageData.data[i+1]] + lumB[imageData.data[i+2]]);
  }
  var w = imageData.width;
  var newPixel, err;
  for (var currentPixel = 0; currentPixel <= 
imageDataLength; currentPixel+=4) {
    if (type === “none”) {
      // No dithering
      imageData.data[currentPixel] = imageData.
data[currentPixel] < threshold ? 0 : 255;
    } else if (type === “bayer”) {
      // 4x4 Bayer ordered dithering algorithm
      var x = currentPixel/4 % w;
      var y = Math.floor(currentPixel/4 / w);
      var map = Math.floor( (imageData.data[currentPixel] 
+ bayerThresholdMap[x%4][y%4]) / 2 );
      imageData.data[currentPixel] = (map < threshold) ? 
0 : 255;
    } else if (type === “floydsteinberg”) {
      // Floyd–Steinberg dithering algorithm
      newPixel = imageData.data[currentPixel] < 129 ? 0 
: 255;
      err = Math.floor((imageData.data[currentPixel] - 
newPixel) / 16);
      imageData.data[currentPixel] = newPixel;
      imageData.data[currentPixel       + 4 ] += err*7;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w - 4 ] += err*3;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w     ] += err*5;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w + 4 ] += err*1;
    } else {
      // Bill Atkinson’s dithering algorithm
      newPixel = imageData.data[currentPixel] < 129 ? 0 
: 255;
      err = Math.floor((imageData.data[currentPixel] - 
newPixel) / 8);
      imageData.data[currentPixel] = newPixel;
      imageData.data[currentPixel       + 4 ] += err;
      imageData.data[currentPixel       + 8 ] += err;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w - 4 ] += err;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w     ] += err;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 4*w + 4 ] += err;
      imageData.data[currentPixel + 8*w     ] += err;
    }
    // Set g and b pixels equal to r
    imageData.data[currentPixel + 1] = imageData.
data[currentPixel + 2] = imageData.data[currentPixel];
  }
  return imageData;
}
    var canvas = document.getElementById(“c2”);
    
    var ctx = canvas.getContext(“2d”);
    ctx.canvas.width  = w;
    ctx.canvas.height = h;
    
    var imageData  = ctx.getImageData( 0, 0, w, h);
    
    var dither = monochrome(imageData, 10, 
“floydsteinberg”)
    ctx.putImageData( imageData, 0, 0);
    
    var canvas = document.getElementById(“c”);
    
    var ctx = canvas.getContext(“2d”);
    
    var imageData  = ctx.getImageData( 0, 0, w, h);
    
    var dither = monochrome(imageData, 10, 
“floydsteinberg”)
    ctx.putImageData( imageData, 0, 0);
    
</script>
    
    </body>
    </html>
65
66
